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ABSTRACT Chen Shui-bian achieved an international reputation for his
promotion of Taiwan independence. Whilst that reputation may have been
well earned, the analyses on which this conclusion is based are frequently
flawed in two ways. First, by using an undifferentiated notion of indepen-
dence, they tend to conflate sovereignty with less threatening expressions
of Taiwanese identity and pro-democracy discourse. Second, by failing to
take into account the impact of immediate strategic context, analysts ignore
a fundamental element of democratic political communication. In our
empirical analysis of more than 2,000 of Chen’s speeches, we seek to
avoid both flaws by unpacking the concept of independence and taking
into account Chen’s strategic relationship with his primary audiences. Our
findings challenge popular portrayals of Chen, but more importantly they
have strong implications for policy makers and students of political rhetoric
with regard to current and future ROC presidents.
During his time as president of the Republic of China (ROC), Chen Shui-bian 陳
水扁 achieved international notoriety for his promotion of “Taiwan indepen-
dence.”1 With the taut strategic conditions prevailing in the Taiwan Strait,
Chen was routinely depicted in international media as being provocative and
quixotic.2 Nor was his portrayal as an irresponsible adventurer bent on indepen-
dence limited to popular literature. A classic example of the “reckless adventurer”
narrative can be found in Robert Ross’s article on “Taiwanese revisionism.”3
Writing in 2006, Ross declared that “Taiwan has taken incremental steps that sig-
nal its intention to declare independence” and left no doubt that it was Chen, a
“risk acceptant leader” with a “personal commitment to independence,” who was
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1 As an indication of this fame, a Lexis-Nexis search of English language news sources between 2003 and
2008 returns 1,390 articles with three or more mentions of Chen in connection with “Taiwan
independence.”
2 A similar Lexis-Nexis search returns 464 articles in which Chen is associated three or more times with
“recklessness” or “danger.”
3 Robert Ross, “Explaining Taiwan’s revisionist diplomacy,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 15,
No. 48 (2006), pp. 443–58. For an alternative opinion see Edward Friedman, “Taiwan’s independence
plot,” Issues and Studies, Vol. 42, No. 4 (2006), pp. 67–95.
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the most persuasive explanation for Taiwan’s revisionism.”4
The purpose of this article is not to dispute such characterizations of Chen’s
presidency. Instead its objective is to develop an operational understanding of
Chen’s presidential discourse and to explicitly measure the content of his rhetoric.
In doing so we will try to demonstrate that the idea that Chen expressed a con-
stant level of independence rhetoric is not supported by systematic large-scale
analysis of his speeches. Cross-Strait relations, under any ROC president, involve
a multi-layered set of issues and interrelated discourses that should not be
reduced to ill defined notions of “Taiwan independence.” We argue that a mini-
mum requirement for analysing Chen’s discourse is to distinguish language relat-
ing to Taiwan sovereignty from less threatening expressions of Taiwanese identity
and pro-democracy rhetoric. Furthermore, the majority of commentators dis-
turbed by Chen’s seemingly erratic discursive behaviour fail to recognize a funda-
mental logic of democratic political communication. Democratically elected
leaders are obliged to look for support from multiple constituencies to achieve
their policy goals.5 Chen was no exception,6 and since the numerous dimensions
of Taiwan’s national status involve a complex of issues and multiple stakeholders
with whom he had to engage, the content of his statements can be expected to
contain substantial variation. Simply put, different constituencies vary in their
concerns and politicians are often required to make strategic decisions about
which issues to emphasize and what kinds of language to generate in order to
appeal to that constituency.7 By recognizing that audiences provide the immedi-
ate strategic context within which Chen operated and by exploring the variation
in the content of his rhetoric over a large number of speeches, this article attempts
to give a more balanced picture of Chen’s presidential discourse.
Disaggregating Cross-Strait Discourse
As shown by the excitement that Chen and his predecessor’s “provocative state-
ments” generated in Beijing and Washington, the public assertions of the ROC
president are a matter of major importance. Under both Lee Teng-hui 李登輝
4 Ross, “Explaining Taiwan’s revisionist diplomacy,” p. 456.
5 Philip Converse, “The nature of belief systems in mass publics,” in David Apter (ed.), Ideology and
Discontent (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206–62; Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren
Miller and Donald Stokes, The American Voter (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1960); V.O.
Key, The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting 1936–1960 (Cambridge, MA:
Belknap Press, 1966); Samuel Popkin, The Reasoning Voter (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1991); John Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1992).
6 For instance Cal Clark, “The paradox of the national identity issue in Chen Shui-Bian’s 2004 presiden-
tial campaign: base constituencies vs the moderate middle,” Issues and Studies, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2004),
pp. 53–86.
7 This is in contrast to a full information spatial politics model with a single homogenous audience, where
political actors are expected to gravitate towards a single “median-voter” position. Anthony Downs, An
Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); Melvin Hinich and Michael
Munger, Analytical Politics (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1997).
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and for better or worse, rhetoric emanating from the presidential palace came to
be interpreted as an indicator of Taiwan’s underlying preferences and policy pos-
itions.8 In the absence of unforeseen developments, the attention and importance
attached to Lee and Chen’s statements also holds true for Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九,
and indeed for any future president. A systematic investigation of Chen
Shui-bian’s public statements is thus an important undertaking not solely for
its historical interest but as an exercise that is relevant for the study of any
ROC president’s rhetoric.
Our point of departure is the contention that, just as “national identity”
measured at the individual level requires separation into its conceptual parts,9
so it is necessary to unpack what is meant by “independence” discourse.
Drawing on the large body of Taiwan studies literature that has dealt with this
issue, we provide a framework for analysing Chen’s statements by identifying
three salient dimensions: sovereignty, Taiwanese identity and pro-democracy.
Formal independence and Taiwan sovereignty
One thing that stands out when surveying the literature on cross-Strait relations is
that Taiwan scholars seldom appear pre-occupied by the prospect of indepen-
dence, at least when independence is defined as the formal declaration of an inde-
pendent Taiwanese state. For example, Shelley Rigger observes that “the idea has
become so marginalized that overt promotion of independence within the politi-
cal arena has all but disappeared.”10 Whether as a result of China’s explicit
equation of independence with war or because of a positive preference for the
status quo, the configuration of Taiwanese public opinion is stable and
unequivocally against an immediate declaration of formal independence.11 The
marginalization of support for independence has effectively rendered the issue
“electoral poison.”12 Given the PRC’s intractable opposition and the ROC’s
diplomatic isolation, Taiwan would gain nothing and risk losing its existing
autonomy and more, just to make “a futile gesture ignored by the international
community.”13 As Edward Friedman puts it, “even if the Taiwan president, after
a popular referendum, announced to the world ‘I now declare the existence of a
sovereign Republic of Taiwan and ask the world community to establish full
8 In reality Chen faced heavy constraints in turning rhetoric into policy outcomes. As Alan Romberg
pointed out, “the proposals Chen can carry out would not take him across PRC ‘redlines’; those that
would, he lacks the wherewithal to carry out.”“ Recent developments in Taiwan: Politics in command-
but at what cost?” PacNet No. 6 (2006), p. 1.
9 Shelley Rigger, “Social science and national identity: a critique,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 4 (1999),
pp. 537–52.
10 Shelley Rigger, “Maintaining the status quo: what it means and why Taiwanese prefer it,” Cambridge
Review of International Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2001), p. 104.
11 Emerson Niou, “Understanding Taiwan independence and its policy implications,” Asian Survey, Vol.
44, No. 4 (2004), pp. 555–67.
12 Dafydd Fell, Party Politics in Taiwan (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 122.
13 Shelley Rigger, “Party politics and Taiwan’s external relations,” Orbis, Vol. 49, No. 3 (2005), p. 428.
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away from the PRC in order to recognize and support a Republic of Taiwan.15
Apart from a small minority, elites and voters in Taiwan are well aware of this
and, as Friedman concludes, “de jure independence is going nowhere.”16
Nevertheless, the sovereignty question constitutes an important dimension of
discourse on cross-Strait relations. Alan Wachman observes how the contest to
exercise sovereignty over Taiwan has been “displaced to the rhetorical arena
where the disputants tangle over slogans, concepts and labels.”17 In this sense,
a crucial development within the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the
mid-1990s was the ideational and rhetorical shift from the pursuit of a chimerical
Republic of Taiwan to Taiwanese self determination within the status quo frame-
work of the ROC.18 The basic position is virtually identical to Lee Teng-hui’s
statement that “the ROC has been a sovereign state since it was founded in
1912 [and] consequently there is no need to declare independence.”19 This
“repackaging of independence” made the DPP more credible at the polls20 and
freed the party to pursue its localization programme once in power without esca-
lating tensions in the Strait to the point of military conflict.21 Chao notes that the
DPP was able to “redefine the terms of independence by stressing preservation of
the status quo over reconstruction of a new entity.”22 This version of “indepen-
dence” was apparently less threatening to the PRC. How else, asks Kenneth
Lieberthal, can we explain the fact that “for more than a decade Taiwan’s leaders
have declared Taiwan to be an ‘independent sovereign country’ without dramatic
consequences”?23 There is also a stronger, though naturally contested, basis for
the ROC’s sovereignty claim.24
The evolution of the DPP’s position is consistent with Lowell Dittmer’s obser-
vation that “the overall pattern of political movement, whether public opinion or
macro political narratives, is from one China to a two sovereign states
14 Friedman, “Taiwan’s independence plot,” p. 78.
15 For a more detailed vision of the “worst case scenario” see Yu-shan Wu, “Taiwanese nationalism and its
implications: Testing the worst-case scenario,” Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No. 4 (2004), pp. 614–25.
16 Friedman, “Taiwan’s independence plot,” p. 76.
17 Alan Wachman, “The China–Taiwan relationship: a cold war of words,” Orbis, Vol. 45, No. 4 (2000),
p. 699.
18 The salient document in this regard is the “Resolution on Taiwan’s Future,” adopted at the DPP party
congress in 1999. It states among other things that “Taiwan is a sovereign independent country [and]
although named the ROC under its current constitution is not subject to the jurisdiction of the PRC.”
19 Extracted from Lee’s “state to state” interview with Deutsche Welle in 1999. Italics added.
20 Fell, Party Politics in Taiwan, p. 98.
21 The DPP’s “discovery” of ROC sovereignty was a significant development, not least because the main
thrust of its earlier position was precisely independence from the ROC, which many supporters perceived
to be inherited from the mainland and inconsistent with Taiwan’s historical and political reality.
See Stephane Corcuff, “The supporters of unification and the Taiwanisation movement,” China
Perspectives, Vol. 53 (2005), p. 50.
22 Chien-min Chao, “One step forward, one step backward: Chen Shui-bian’s mainland policy,” Journal of
Contemporary China, Vol. 12, No. 34 (2003), p. 141.
23 Kenneth Lieberthal, “Preventing a war over Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 2 (2005), p. 54.
24 A more forthright statement in this vein is the argument that, “while Taiwan is definitely independent, it
is so, in law, only as the ROC, not as Taiwan.” Corcuff, “The supporters of unification and the
Taiwanisation movement,” p. 50.
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“overarching consensus” shared by both major parties,26 is that the ROC on
Taiwan is an independent sovereign entity and that the ROC state must be main-
tained. To this end, Taiwan should try to bolster the ROC’s sovereignty claim by
maintaining its small number of diplomatic allies and expanding its role in inter-
national society by applying for membership of international organizations and
maintaining substantive links with any country willing to do so. Taiwan should
also “avoid picking fights with China, by not directly challenging China’s sover-
eignty claim over Taiwan.”27 Like his predecessor, Chen managed to avoid
picking the ultimate fight, but his proclamations on sovereignty and explicit rejec-
tion of “one China” hardened the PRC’s position on Taiwan’s participation in
the international arena and won him few friends in the United States.
Sovereignty was doubtless an important part of Chen’s ideology, but inter-
national conditions and public opinion were such that the range of potential
actions open to him on this front was limited. On the domestic stage, however,
in spite of fierce opposition and institutional constraints, Chen enjoyed greater
freedom to pursue a nation-building project rooted in a particular conception
of national identity.
Taiwan identity
If sovereignty is the external dimension of Chen’s “independence discourse,”
national identity, specifically Taiwanese identity, is the internal dimension. It is
well known that national identity has long been “the dominant cleavage under-
pinning Taiwan’s party situation,”28 and though Chen did not create this situ-
ation, his tenure certainly exacerbated it. What distinguished Chen from more
moderate elements in the DPP and the domestic opposition was his “insistence
on a specific Taiwanese national identity.”29 Though the DPP wriggled free
from earlier commitments to Taiwan independence, it retained a preference for
advancing an explicitly Taiwanese, as opposed to Chinese, identity for Taiwan.
Taiwan identity has an element of ethnic distinction within the domestic context,
but more pertinent to the focus of this article is that it also forms the basis of
attempts to establish or consolidate, depending on one’s viewpoint, Taiwan’s dis-
tinctiveness from China. Amongst other things this distinctiveness is based on the
community of diverse ethnic groups that live in Taiwan and a historical and
cultural specificity that makes it quite distinct from the PRC. The degree of sep-
aration is maintained by Taiwan’s experience as a democracy and by PRC
25 Lowell Dittmer, “Taiwan’s aim-inhibited quest for identity and the China factor,” Journal of Asian and
African Studies, Vol. 40 No. 1/2 (2005), p. 86.
26 Gunther Schubert, “Taiwan’s political parties and national identity: the rise of an overarching consen-
sus,” Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No. 4 (2004), pp. 534–54.
27 Clark, “The paradox of the national identity issue,” p. 79.
28 John Fuh-Sheng Hsieh, “National identity and Taiwan’s mainland China policy,” Journal of
Contemporary China, Vol. 13, No. 40 (2004), p. 479.
29 Schubert, “Taiwan’s political parties and national identity,” p. 548.
Chen Shui-bian: On Independence 623hostility, particularly its refusal to renounce the use of force and its aggressive
efforts to limit Taiwan’s activities in the international realm, which many
Taiwanese believe should be concomitant with the island’s level of economic
development and status as a liberal democracy.30
However, Chen’s project went further than merely emphasizing differences
with the PRC. As Daniel Lynch observed in 2004, Chen oversaw an attempt
to “imagine a completely new and genuinely autonomous Taiwan,” noting
that “Taiwan already has territory, a government and a people: the challenge
remaining is to construct a strong collective identity.”31 Though the project domi-
nated most of Chen’s tenure, particularly after re-election, it was “inhibited
domestically by split sub-ethnic identities.”32 Construction of an exclusively
Taiwanese national identity at the expense of any residue of Chinese-ness was
controversial with Taiwanese who identified politically with Taiwan, but did
not necessarily want to deny their Chinese cultural heritage. Nevertheless, and
with ever fewer options open to him, Chen pursued his “deliberate nation build-
ing effort,”33 enacting aggressive programmes of symbolic Taiwanization and
de-Sinification. Without question, China feared the potential of this project to
consolidate and normalize Taiwan’s de facto separation from the mainland.34
Trends in national identity at the individual level support this view, with a
majority of Taiwanese claiming Taiwan-centred identities by 2004.35 However
the rise in Taiwan-centred identifiers did not translate into a preference for
formal independence,36 another indication that national identity and sovereignty
should be treated as distinct, albeit linked, concepts. Indeed Cabestan
argues that “Taiwanese nationalism” was fed by the competing identities of dom-
estic sub-ethnic groups, rather than a desire to separate from the Chinese
nation.37 There is some evidence that Chen and other DPP figures, particularly
during the re-election campaign in 2004, sought to tie sub-ethnic identity to pre-
ferences on national status.38 Similarly, Chen made a major effort in both of his
presidential campaigns to frame himself as the embodiment of an essential
Taiwan.39
30 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “Specificities and limits of Taiwanese nationalism,” China Perspectives, Vol. 62
(2005), p. 37.
31 Daniel Lynch, “Taiwan’s self-conscious nation-building project,” Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No. 4 (2004),
p. 514.
32 Dittmer, “Taiwan’s aim-inhibited quest for identity and the China factor,” p. 72.
33 Lowell Dittmer, “Taiwan and the issue of national identity,” Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No. 4 (2004), p. 475.
34 Wachman, “The China–Taiwan relationship.”
35 T.Y. Wang and I.C. Liu, “Contending identities in Taiwan: implications for cross-Strait relations,”
Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No. 4 (2004), pp. 568–90.
36 The link between micro (individual identity) and macro-politics (political movements) is perceptively
examined in Niou, “Understanding Taiwan independence and its policy implications”; Yu-shan Wu,
“Taiwanese nationalism and its implications”; Wang and Liu “Contending identities in Taiwan.”
37 Cabestan, “Specificities and limits of Taiwanese nationalism,” p. 34.
38 Clark, “The paradox of the national identity issue.”
39 For a perceptive account of Chen’s “Son of Taiwan” campaign rhetoric in 2000, see Shelley Rigger,
From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001).
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The ideas of democracy, ethnic justice and self determination have been inter-
twined since the first stirrings of democratization in the 1970s. Many opposition
activists, who joined in 1986 to form the DPP, explicitly linked the goal of demo-
cratization to “the issue of Taiwanese identity and the principle of self-
determination.”40 In this way the Dangwai 黨外 and subsequently the DPP
were able to gather support for “ethnic justice internally and independence
from China externally”41 whilst simultaneously countering the KMT’s successful
socio-economic programmes and uniting activists with disparate agendas. In the
1970s and 1980s the ruling KMT also saw democratization not only as a
“pressure valve” to release growing discontent but as a crucial means of legiti-
mating their rule both domestically and abroad. Thus there has long been a
“symbolic dimension to democratization” in Taiwan.42 Naturally, Taiwan’s
democracy is also a source of pride and identification for many Taiwanese;
another practical and psychological element in their estrangement from the PRC.
Given this background, and the context of Chen’s initiation into politics as a
defence attorney for the Meilidao 美麗島 activists, it was no surprise that, as a
presidential candidate and president, he campaigned vigorously for democratic
and institutional reforms.43 Indeed, during his re-election campaign Chen por-
trayed himself as a democratic champion, juxtaposed with opponents who
were framed as denying the people direct democracy. Part of Chen’s emphasis
on institutional reforms was purely practical: Taiwan’s experience of divided gov-
ernment, particularly during the early part of his first term, was a complete and
debilitating breakdown of executive–legislative relations.44 The remainder was
perhaps part genuine commitment to democratic reform combined with making
use of supposed democratic reforms for political ends, both domestically and
with respect to China. Accusations of heavy-handedness and financial corruption
during Chen’s second term did not help the perception of the balance of these two
motivations.
Two of Chen’s “democratic” initiatives, referenda and constitution reform,
were the cause of much controversy. The “defensive referendum” held in 2004
has been decried as a ploy to build momentum for Chen’s re-election bid and
40 Tse-Min Lin, Yun-Han Chu and Melvin J. Hinich, “Conflict displacement and regime transition in
Taiwan: a spatial analysis,” World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 4 (1996), pp. 453–81.
41 Clark, “The paradox of the national identity issue,” p. 74.
42 Stephane Corcuff, “The symbolic dimension of democratization and the transition of national identity
under Lee Teng-hui,” in Stephane Corcuff (ed.), Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the
Search for a New Taiwan (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002). In light of Chen’s troubled tenure and a
legacy further tarnished by post-presidency corruption charges, it is easy to forget the symbolic magni-
tude of his surprise victory in 2000. For a stirring account of those momentous times see Rigger, From
Opposition to Power.
43 Rigger, From Opposition to Power.
44 John F. Copper, “Taiwan: democracy’s gone awry?” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 12, No. 34
(2003), pp. 145–62; Yun-han Chu, “Taiwan’s year of stress,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, No. 2
(2005), pp. 43–58.
Chen Shui-bian: On Independence 625to increase the feeling of danger from China’s missile build-up across the Strait,
rather than promoting the stated goal of “direct democracy.”45 Whilst Chen was
assiduousinframingreferendaasademocraticreformgiving“powertothepeople,”
given the content of the defensive referenda held in 2004 and 2008 concurrent with
presidential elections – from which the DPP would theoretically gain advantage by
ensuring the salience of the accompanying democracy and national identity dis-
coursesonwhichtheyreliedforelectoralsuccess–onecannotignoretheprobability
that referenda were used as election tools.46 Another suspicion, albeit one we find
less convincing, was that referenda were “a ploy to take Taiwan one step further
towards outright independence by introducing a procedure through which consti-
tutional changes could be sanctioned.”47 Constitution reform was similarly framed
as a crucial institutional reform, one that was undeniably needed.48 Yet when
Chen made writing a new constitution the goal for his last two years in office, it
raised considerable anxietythathewas“gearing uptoformallycementtheachieve-
ments of the localization movement,” perhaps by touching on the taboo consti-
tutional issues of sovereignty and territory.49
Audiences as an Indicator of Strategic Context
Taiwan under Chen Shui-bian was the most dynamic actor in cross-Strait
relations. Like his predecessor Lee Teng-hui, Chen apparently employed “creep-
ing independence and provocative brinkmanship [to] redefine the direction and
purpose of change.”50 In this sense Taiwan played a clear role in setting the
cross-Strait political agenda and was largely responsible for the cyclical trend
in relations that veered between acceptable stalemate and periodic spikes in ten-
sion.51 After displaying moderation and flexibility in the first two years of his
tenure,52 beginning in the summer of 2002 Chen “reprised Lee’s pattern of pro-
vocative statements.”53 A second element to Chen’s discourse was that it was
highly erratic, veering between opposing positions, sometimes from one speech
45 Mily Kao, “The referendum phenomenon in Taiwan,” Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No. 4 (2004), pp. 591–613;
Mikael Mattlin, “Referendum as a form of zaoshi,” Issues and Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2004), pp. 155–
85. We should remember however that provision for referenda was written in the ROC Constitution and
the legislation that activated article 136 was a KMT sponsored bill passed in a legislature controlled by
the KMT and its allies.
46 Ibid. Although holding referenda concurrent with presidential elections was clever, particularly in 2004,
it should also be noted that this it is not unusual in other democracies, usually for cost-cutting purposes.
47 Mikael Mattlin, “Same content, different wrapping: cross-Strait policy under DPP rule,” China
Perspectives, Vol. 56 (2004), p. 29.
48 Rigger, “Party politics and Taiwan’s external relations,” p. 422; Flemming Christiansen, “Putting
Taiwan’s constitution on the agenda,” European Association of Taiwan Studies, University of
London, April 2004, p. 1.
49 Mattlin, “Same content, different wrapping,” p. 33.
50 Dittmer, “Taiwan’s aim-inhibited quest,” p. 87.
51 Steven Goldstein, “The Taiwan Strait: a continuing status quo of deadlock?” Cambridge Review of
International Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2002), p. 85.
52 Joseph Wu, “Political earthquake and aftershocks: the DPP after the 2000 presidential election,” Journal
of Contemporary China, Vol. 11, No. 33 (2002), p. 638.
53 Dittmer, “Taiwan and the issue of national identity,” p. 478.
626 The China Quarterly, 203, September 2010, pp. 619–638to the next. As Lieberthal observed, “Chen has created a record that seems to
support almost any position on the spectrum.”54 Though it is hard to argue
with Sheng’s depiction of Chen’s eclectic statements as “ambiguous, evasive
and contradictory,”55 the concept of “strategic ambiguity” is perhaps more use-
ful. Cal Clark notes two discrete facets of Chen’s strategically ambiguous state-
ments: elucidating different positions at different times, and making different
appeals on the same issue to disparate constituencies.56 Whilst this apparent
inconsistency might be damning, in fact these two patterns are consistent with
democratic politics in almost any context. Issues and policy stances evolve, pro-
blems and new actors emerge, and politicians have no choice but to engage with
and appeal to a wide range of stakeholders with varied agendas.57
Given this fundamental feature of bureaucratic and electoral politics, we
hypothesize that the content of Chen’s speeches on sovereignty, Taiwan identity
and democracy may vary according to the particular strategic relationship that he
has with his immediate audience. Specifically, Chen will modify the content of
any speech towards the perceived preference of his primary audience. Naturally
speeches may be expected to reach other audiences,58 perhaps ones that do not
share the same preferences as the primary audience. There is a risk therefore
that any advantages gained by “playing to the crowd” might be cancelled out
when the same message reaches another audience. In this scenario, the safest
option for a speaker would be to pitch the speech in a way that neither fully
enthused nor completely enraged both audiences.59 We do not deny the likeli-
hood of Chen’s speeches reaching audiences other than the primary one he was
addressing. However we do argue that the probability of this happening falls
short of inevitability, freeing Chen to some extent to adjust the content of his
speeches in accordance with his primary audience. We make this claim based
on the observation that the majority of Chen’s speeches received little television
or print coverage. They were made available online, but we feel confident that the
information costs incurred to find, access and process the transcripts would deter
all but the most dedicated. Furthermore, the advantage of the method we
54 Lieberthal, “Preventing a war over Taiwan,” p. 54.
55 Lijun Sheng, China and Taiwan: Cross-Straits Relations under Chen Shuibian (New York: Zed Books,
2002), p. 123.
56 Clark, “The paradox of the national identity issue,” p. 80.
57 Jeffrey Cohen, “Presidential rhetoric and the public agenda,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.
39, No. 1 (1995), pp. 87–107; George Edwards III and B. Dan Wood, “Who influences whom? The
President, Congress and the media,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 2 (1999), pp.
327–44; Calvin Mouw and Michael Mackuen, “The strategic agenda in legislative politics,” American
Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 1 (1992), pp. 87–105; William Riker, The Art of Political
Manipulation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).
58 Indeed there is tentative evidence to suggest that Chen, and Lee before him, purposefully used a paro-
chial stage to project a message to a much wider audience. Lin finds that of 40 “key speeches” delivered
between 1992 and 2005, the majority of the ones that emphasized “Taiwan’s independent sovereignty or
protested PRC aggression” used informal occasions to do so. Jih-wen Lin, “Uncovering the informal
dimensions of Taiwan’s cross-Strait policy-making,” 34th Sino-American Conference, University of
Virginia, 2005, p. 9.
59 Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy.
Chen Shui-bian: On Independence 627introduce below is that if our argument and assumptions are fundamentally mis-
guided, the data will unequivocally reveal our mistake.
The significant variation in the kinds of relationships Chen “enjoyed” with
business interests, the military, his own party, indeed different factions within the
DPP, the foreign media, pro-independence groups overseas, diplomatic allies and
soon,60reinforcesourdecisiontotreattheprimaryaudienceasastrategiccontextual
indicator. Unavoidably, as president in a democratic society, Chen was obliged to
appeal to, mobilize and persuade a wide range of actors whose positions on, for
example,cross-Straitrelationsvaried.Itwouldbesensible,indeedrational,therefore,
if Chen decided to modify the content of his speeches to some extent, to account for
this strategic context. Our argument leads us to believe that it was not a coincidence
that Chen’s “one country on each side” speech was delivered to a pro-independence
support group overseas. Nor was it a matter of chance that Chen’s inauguration
speeches,wherewecanassumethatotherinternationalactorswerethedefactoaudi-
ence, were noted for their comparatively moderate content.
Methods and Data
In this study we use computer-assisted content analysis (CCA)61 to identify the
presence and estimate the amount of presidential language that reflects our
three discursive categories of sovereignty, identity and democracy. CCA assumes
that theoretically relevant categories of content are not directly observed, but that
particular words and phrases reflect them in a systematic way. Specifically, the
speaker’s choice of words and the frequency with which they are used provide
multiple indicators of latent content. Any particular word or phrase may be an
unreliable indicator of a complex concept, but when such indicators are com-
bined into a theoretically informed category structure to form a content analysis
dictionary, this can generate a reliable mechanism for tapping content.62 Political
speeches are well suited to CCA because the speaker cannot make strong assump-
tions about the extent to which an audience shares the nuances of their vocabu-
lary choices. One solution to this problem is thus for the speaker to use relatively
unambiguous keywords and simple imagery. CCA has been successfully applied
to political party manifestos, parliamentary speeches and even legal briefs.63
Naturally CCA cannot replicate the nuances of an in-depth discourse analysis,
but it does have two important advantages. First, a CCA dictionary is
60 Saša Istenic ˇ, “Taiwan’s business communities in mainland China: contesting influence over cross-Strait
economic policy,” Leeds East Asia Papers, No. 65 (2004); Elizabeth Freund Larus, “Taiwan’s quest for
international recognition,” Issues and Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2006), pp. 23–52; Catherine Lin,
“Taiwan’s overseas opposition movement and grassroots diplomacy in the United States: the case of
the Formosan Association for Public Affairs,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 15, No. 46
(2006), pp. 133–59; Jih-wen Lin, “Uncovering the informal dimensions of Taiwan’s cross-Strait
policy-making.”
61 Roel Popping, Computer-Assisted Text Analysis (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2000).
62 Kimberley Neuendorf, The Content Analysis Guidebook (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2002).
63 Michael Laver, Ken Benoit and John Garry, “Extracting policy positions from political texts using
words as data,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 2 (2003), pp. 311–31.
628 The China Quarterly, 203, September 2010, pp. 619–638transparent and replicable. Second, it is possible to apply CCA on a much larger
scale. This was an important consideration for us; in the period under investi-
gation Chen gave 2,236 speeches over the course of 2,255 days.
Measures of sovereignty, identity and democracy
Our three categories were determined by literature review as outlined above. The
sovereignty category is intended to cover references to Taiwan’s existing indepen-
dent status, its claim to sovereignty, boundary distinctions between Taiwan and
China, and advocacy of actions that reinforce these ideas, such as strengthening
the sovereignty claim by expanding Taiwan’s international role and writing a
new constitution. The national identity category covers signifiers of a distinct col-
lectiveidentitybasedoncommonpointsofidentification,referencestoadistinctive
andpredominantlyhostile“other,”andendorsementsofordutiestotheidentifying
collectivity.Thedemocracycategorycoversreferencestodemocraticachievements
and the existence of rights and freedoms. We privilege Chen’s own framing of the
referendumandconstitutionreformissuesbyincludingtheminthedemocracycat-
egory along with other proposed democratic reforms. Whilst we acknowledge that
these two issues have been interpreted as impinging on sovereignty64 and could be
included in our sovereignty category, we also note that Chen was assiduous in
decoupling referenda and constitution reform from sovereignty.65
We selected indicators of these three categories inductively through a manual
analysis of a sample of 200 of Chen’s speeches. Table 1 shows our framework with
example indicators. The dictionary contains 120 patterns, 45 each in the sovereignty
and identity categories and 30 in the democracy category.66 Purely for the purpose of
comparison we also constructed an economics category. The economics dictionary is
made up of 20 generic economic terms such as “banking” and “stock market” and in
this article we attach no theoretical or substantive importance to them.67
Data
In this article we analyse the 2,236 speeches given by Chen Shui-bian between 7
June 2000 and 18 October 2006 that were available at time of writing.68 The
64 Kao, “The referendum phenomenon in Taiwan;” Christiansen, “Putting Taiwan’s constitution on the
agenda,” These authors also note that referenda were conceived as a means for Chen to bypass the insti-
tutional gridlock created by divided government.
65 See for instance Shelley Rigger, “Taiwan in 2003,” Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2004), p. 187. We
intend the empirical analysis to demonstrate, at least, that this reading of the referendum and consti-
tutional reform issues is reasonable.
66 To some extent the construction of any content dictionary requires subjective decisions about the con-
notations of word and phrase content in a complex discourse (as indicated by the discussion of referenda
and constitutional reform above). Our dictionary is thus not intended to be the final word on textual
indicators of the three categories.
67 Subsequent work will, however, explore the economic integration aspect of cross-Strait discourse.
68 Between 20 March and 7 June 2000, three Chen speeches were available, including one as president-elect
and his first inauguration. Though these are obviously important speeches, the consistent record of
President Chen’s public speeches did not begin until 7 June 2000.
Chen Shui-bian: On Independence 629speeches were downloaded from the Office of the President website,69 verbatim
and in Chinese, using computer scripts. The texts were then converted into
machine-readable form for subsequent analysis. To construct the content diction-
ary we use the Yoshikoder,70 an open-source software package developed by the
second author.71 The Yoshikoder is a desktop application that runs on any oper-
ating system and can deal with text documents in any natural language.
In addition to the content of the speeches, we are also interested in a strategic
dimension, that is, Chen’s decision to emphasize or de-emphasize language
related to a certain category in accordance with his relationship to a particular
audience. We have again drawn on the literature as a guide to the type of groups
Chen had to engage and their possible different interests and agendas relating to
cross-Strait relations. We identified 34 different groups which we aggregate into
ten broad categories. These are shown in Table 2, with examples of finer grained
audience distinctions. With audience categories established, we assigned an
Table 1: Organization of Dictionaries
Category Example patterns in English Selected search entries
Sovereignty Taiwan sovereignty, Taiwan is sovereign
and independent, Taiwan is an
independent/complete/normal country,
Taiwan is a country, equality with
China, one Taiwan one China, one side
one country, special state to state
relations, Taiwan is not China,
national borders, Taiwan’s own road,
go our own way, all new Taiwan
constitution, name rectiﬁcation, apply
to UN/WHO, diplomatic/international
space, …
台灣主權, 主權獨立, 獨立的國家,
完整的國家, 正常的國家,台灣是
一個國家, 一臺一中, 一邊一國,
特殊國與國關係, 台灣不是中國,
國家 疆域, 台灣自己的路, 走我
們台灣的路, 全新憲法,台灣新憲
法, 以台灣名義申請, 外交空間,
國際空間, 尊嚴平等…
National
identity
23 million citizens, the Taiwan nation,
our land, our future, our history, our
country, new Taiwanese, Gemeinshaft;
China’s weapons,united front, military
threats, diminish Taiwan, eat up
Taiwan, the other side; protect Taiwan,
Taiwan stand up, Taiwan ﬁrst, love
Taiwan, God bless Taiwan, …
兩千三百萬人民, 台灣人民, 台灣民
族, 台灣這塊土地, 台灣的前途,
我們的國家, 台灣主體, 台灣意
識, 新台灣人, 共同體, 和諧, 中共
武力, 中國的武器, 中國的統戰,
武力的恐嚇, 矮化, 吃掉台灣, 對
岸, 顧台灣, 台灣站起來, 台灣優
先, 台灣第一, 愛台灣, 守護台灣,
天佑台灣…
Democracy Democratization, democratic reforms,
shake off authoritarianism, liberal
constitutional system, human rights,
citizen rights/freedoms, referendum,
amend/reform the constitution, …
民主改革, 民主化, 民主自由, 戒嚴,
獨裁, 威權, 人權, 言論自由, 政治
權利, 出版自由, 公民自由, 人民
的權利, 憲政體制, 公投, 公民投
票, 修憲, 憲改…
69 http://www.president.gov.tw.
70 http://www.yoshikoder.org.
71 Will Lowe, “Yoshikoder: an open source multilingual content analysis tool for social scientists,” APSA
Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, 2006.
630 The China Quarterly, 203, September 2010, pp. 619–638audience to each speech using information attached to the speeches provided by
the Office of the President.72
Figure 1 shows the proportion of speeches that Chen gave to different audi-
ences. Domestic non-political audiences constituted approximately half of his
speaking engagements, with the smallest amount of attention paid to foreign
media (fmed). The number of speeches to overseas support groups (dias)i s
also very small. This distribution forms the background to understanding the
importance of strategic factors in Chen’s discourse, because it is partly on the
basis of his engagements with foreign media and pro-independence groups that
analysts formed their perceptions of his positions.73 If Chen’s emphases on sover-
eignty, Taiwan identity and democracy are different when faced with a less rare
audience then we may reasonably conclude that it is his opinions to
pro-independence groups that need to be discounted in favour of those to local
audiences with whom he more frequently engaged.74
Although it is not the central focus of the article, we also suspect that Chen
may have altered the content of his speeches in reaction to important external
Table 2: Audience Categories
Broad audiences Example narrow audiences Code
National Day,
New Year
Includes 1 January and Chinese New Year speeches ndny
Allies Diplomatic allies, heads of state and other political leaders alli
Diaspora Taiwan independence groups overseas, Diaspora groups dias
Domestic
non-political
School children and students, sports men and women, cultural
groups, scientists, women’s groups, environmentalists
domn
Domestic political DPP party, policy makers, foundations, campaign supporters,
local media interviews
domp
Economic Regional economic organizations, Taishang (台商), Taiwanese
business people, chambers of commerce
econ
Foreign dignitaries Politicians of non-diplomatic allies, scholars, cultural leaders
from non-allied countries Taiwan/overseas
fdig
Foreign media Interviews with international publications fmed
Military All branches of armed forces and coastguard mili
Other formal
speeches
Inauguration speeches, addresses to the nation form
72 Exceptionally, in the case of “New Year and National Day” and other formal speeches, such as inau-
gurations, we coded the form of the speech rather than the audience.
73 At this point we should acknowledge that our strategic argument is under-determined by the available
data, by which we mean that our assessment of Chen’s discursive behaviour is more difficult in the
absence of comparative data. Unfortunately, speeches made by other political figures in Taiwan, e.g.
in the opposition, were not available in anything like the same abundance as Chen’s. Similarly, our argu-
ment about audiences is weakened by the absence of data on the positions and preferences of these
groups. In effect we are limited to the inference that Chen’s relationship with these groups varied,
but the degree and direction of this variation we leave to future work.
74 By this statement we do not mean to imply that all audiences (and all speeches) are equally important.
However, in our large-scale analysis we treat audiences as separate effects to avoid the problems, dis-
cussed in the introduction, of arbitrarily attaching importance to select audiences.
Chen Shui-bian: On Independence 631events. To test this supplementary hypothesis we analysed speech content
relative to a set of international and domestic political events that we considered
might affect his emphasis on our three discursive categories. Initially we used 21
events such as presidential and legislative elections. Of these 21 events only three
had a discernable (and statistically significant) impact on the levels of our cat-
egories: Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao’s accession to the PRC leadership, the pas-
sing of the anti-secession law, and Chen’s re-election. These three events are
thus included in the following analysis.
Results and Discussion
The first question we are interested in is the frequency with which Chen makes
reference to sovereignty, Taiwan identity or democracy. To see how often each
of the three categories is covered in a speech it is sufficient to code whether at
least one pattern from a category is matched by any sentence in a speech – a
“mention.” If a speech has mentions of a category then we can infer that the
topic was addressed, although we cannot yet say how much coverage it was
subsequently given. Figure 2 shows the results of a logistic regression model
of mentions over time for each category. Each line in the figure is a fitted prob-
ability of mentioning one of our three categories, and, for comparison, general
economic themes. Although we are ultimately interested in the effects of
individual audiences, we first aggregate all audiences to show the general
category trends over time. The three external events that served to raise or
lower the probability of Chen mentioning each category are shown as labelled
vertical lines at the appropriate point in time. The vertical axis indicates the prob-
ability of any speech containing any one of the search terms in our content
dictionaries.
Figure 2 shows that the probability of Chen mentioning three of the four cat-
egories is high and increasing over time. His speeches are least likely to contain
Figure 1: Proportion of Speeches to Different Audiences
632 The China Quarterly, 203, September 2010, pp. 619–638references to the sovereignty issue, but the probability of a mention does increase
with time. At the beginning of his term about 10 per cent of speeches mention
the topic, but by the time he is re-elected this has more than doubled. There is
also a discernable bump in sovereignty talk after the anti-secession law passed,
although we can’t be sure that this is uniquely attributable to this event. By
the end of our time period the proportion of speeches touching on sovereignty
is approaching 40 per cent. In contrast, democracy and Taiwan identity are
mentioned in approximately 60 per cent of speeches when Chen takes office
and this proportion rises slowly at a similar rate until the anti-secession law is
passed, when identity issues jump to being mentioned in 80 per cent of speeches.
There is a constant 80 per cent chance of any of Chen’s speeches mentioning
economics, although we show below that this belies a decreasing emphasis on
the topic. Including the economics category here is intended to show that
increases in our three main categories are not a result of Chen simply talking
more.75
Examining mentions is a measure of how often Chen covers one of the
categories, but we are more interested in how much emphasis he subsequently
provides. To see this, we examine the proportion of each speech devoted to
each category. Figure 3 shows the results of a similar logistic regression model
fitted to the amount of sentences in each speech attributable to each of our cat-
egories. Again, we measure this over time, include external events and aggregate
the audiences. The vertical axis shows the proportion of sentences in any speech
that contain words or phrases in our content dictionary.
It is clear that the proportions involved are small. At its highest point, words
and phrases in the democracy category make up just 5 per cent of any speech,
nearly doubling from just under 3 per cent at the beginning of the period.
Figure 2: Probability of Mentioning Any One Category
75 In fact Chen’s speeches do get longer over the period, so to take account for this and avoid biasing the
results, all of our models are normalized by the length of each speech.
Chen Shui-bian: On Independence 633However, given that not all speeches can be solely about the virtues of democratic
governance, these proportions may actually be quite high. Nevertheless it is clear
that sovereignty issues take up the smallest proportion of any of Chen’s speeches:
on average less than 1 per cent. Interestingly, external events have more effect on
the emphasis Chen places on each category than on whether or not he decides to
mention them. For example, we see all of the accumulated increase in the pro-
portion of each speech concerning democracy removed after the change of leader-
ship in China. Chen’s re-election generates a brief increase in both Taiwan
identity and sovereignty, but the subsequent anti-secession law has the opposite
effect, leading him to de-emphasize sovereignty topics and slightly increase the
proportion of Taiwanese identity rhetoric. Finally, although Figure 2 showed a
constant high probability of mentioning economic themes, Figure 3 reveals a
steady decrease in the proportion of each speech devoted to economics. This
decrease is hastened in Chen’s second term, and again on the passing of the
anti-secession law.
Audience effects
The previous analyses aggregated all audience types in order to show large-scale
variation in our categories. However we are also interested in the effects of indi-
vidual audiences on the content of Chen’s speeches. In the subsequent analysis,
we concentrate on the proportion of each speech devoted to each category over
time, separated by different audiences. If Chen’s message is consistent, regardless
of the audience he is addressing, then there should be, at most, random variation
in the proportion of each speech he devotes to each category. Over more than
2,000 speeches such as we analyse here, random variation would average out,
recreating in the figures below the same shape as the aggregated lines shown in
Figure 3. If that were the case, our argument about Chen adjusting the content
of speeches to different audiences would fall down.
Figure 3: Proportion of Matched Patterns in Each Category
634 The China Quarterly, 203, September 2010, pp. 619–638The next three figures show the results of fitting logistic regression models to
the proportion of each category. This is done over time and disaggregates audi-
ences. The vertical axis indicates the proportion of sentences in a speech with
indicators in our content dictionaries. Contrary to the previous two figures, for
clarity of interpretation we do not include external events, but this does not affect
our argument.76
Figure 4 deals with sovereignty. Far from averaging out to replicate the aggre-
gate proportion, each audience has a visible effect. Moreover this effect is highly
robust. Audience effects are statistically significant in all of the underlying models
presented in this section, a strong indication that we are looking at systematic
rather than random variation. Overall, the proportion of each speech devoted
to sovereignty increases visibly over time, from a uniformly low level when he
took office. This suggests that Chen did indeed become more preoccupied with
sovereignty over time. In addition to this general increase, however, Chen’s audi-
ences have a strong effect in determining the extent of the increase. From highest
to lowest proportion, we see that speeches to foreign media and Diaspora groups
contain the largest amount of sovereignty discourse. Domestic non-political and
economic audiences receive the least. Since around two-thirds of Chen’s speeches
were addressed to these latter two audiences, it is clear that the aggregated pro-
portion line in Figure 3 has been strongly dampened by the block of speeches
given to domestic non-political and economic audiences. Consider that the aver-
age proportion of sovereignty language for all audiences together was around
one-tenth of a per cent, whereas foreign media and Diaspora groups hear
between 1.7 and 1.9 per cent. In short, and as we predicted, there are reliable
differences in emphasis in Chen’s speeches to different audiences. Specifically,
foreign media and pro-independence groups overseas, which constitute a rela-
tively small proportion of Chen’s primary audiences, receive much more sover-
eignty language.77
We now examine whether the same degree of audience effect holds for Taiwan
identity content (Figure 5). Audience effects again have a demonstrable (and
again, in statistical terms, robustly significant) effect on the proportion of Taiwan
identity language in Chen’s speeches. Again we can infer that the large number of
economicanddomesticnon-politicalaudiences,whogettheleastamountofidentity
discourse in their speeches, dampened the aggregated proportion line in Figure 3.
Interestingly,ChenreservedforNewYear,NationalDayandotherformalspeeches
76 This is because external events enter each model additively and raise or lower all audiences’ fitted pro-
portions together; there were no significant interactions. By contrast, our argument depends only on the
relative proportions of each category per audience which all remain the same, rather than their absolute
values.
77 It should be noted that whilst the probability of Chen mentioning indicators of sovereignty appears to be
extremely low, language-use norms dictate that the resting levels of category counts for complex con-
cepts is always likely to be low. George Zipf, Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort
(New York: Hafner, 1965 [1949]).
Chen Shui-bian: On Independence 635the greatest proportion of Taiwan identity language. This is not surprising, in that
these occasions afforded him the highest profile opportunity to promote the
“Taiwanization” agenda at the forefront of his administration.
Finally we turn to pro-democracy language. Figure 6 once again shows that
individual audiences have a strong effect on the proportion of democracy con-
tent. In a similar way to the sovereignty and Taiwan identity themes set out
above, domestic non-political and economic audiences, along with the military,
receive the lowest proportion of democracy content. By contrast, democracy is
an almost constant theme in foreign media appointments, accounting for between
11 and 13 per cent of any such engagements throughout the period. This finding
is in keeping with Chen’s motivation to project Taiwan’s democratic successes to
the world, in contradistinction to the PRC, and as a way of highlighting the injus-
tice of Taiwan’s exclusion from “official” international affairs. Democracy is a
Figure 4: Proportion of Sovereignty Language, by Audience
Figure 5: Proportion of Taiwan Identity Language, by Audience
636 The China Quarterly, 203, September 2010, pp. 619–638strong theme in New Year speeches and to pro-Taiwan support groups overseas
and domestic political audiences.
Conclusion
We began this article by pointing out that Chen Shui-bian earned an inter-
national reputation as a dedicated promoter of “Taiwan independence” during
his tenure as president of the ROC. Critiquing the tendency of the international
media, and some scholars, to propagate this conventional and seldom questioned
notion, we argued that a more useful approach to understanding Chen’s rhetoric
is to decompose cross-Strait discourse into its discursive component parts.
Applying this approach to the analysis of over 2,000 of Chen’s speeches, we
arrived at empirical estimates of the comparative frequency and amount that
Chen talks about sovereignty, national identity and democracy that challenge
the conclusions of analyses based on a small number of selected speeches.78
Methodologically, we have demonstrated that systematic large-scale analysis
reveals an alternative reading of Chen’s rhetoric, which may be a useful comp-
lement to more detailed analyses. Substantively, we have shown that Chen
addressed sovereignty, the category that contains the discursive markers most
likely to connote independence, much less often and much less proportionally,
than Taiwan identity, democracy or the economy. Moreover, the content of
Chen’s speeches, or more specifically Chen’s emphasis on particular discursive
categories, varied substantially and significantly according to the primary audi-
ence to whom he delivered the speech. For instance, foreign media and
pro-Taiwan Diaspora groups were much more frequently exposed to sovereignty
language than any other audience. This finding is of substantive importance for
Figure 6: Proportion of Democracy Language, by Audience
78 Ross, “Explaining Taiwan’s revisionist diplomacy”; Robert Ross, “Taiwan’s fading independence
movement,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2 (2006), pp. 141–48.
Chen Shui-bian: On Independence 637both scholars and policy makers, since the strategic conditions faced by Chen are
likely to influence ROC presidents for the foreseeable future. While exploration
of the link between Chen’s underlying preferences, strategic choices and rhetoric
awaits further investigation, the findings presented here challenge conventional
portrayals of former president Chen and provide a context for analysing demo-
cratic communication in Taiwan.
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